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This paper addresses the upward trend in new drugs introduced by pharmaceutical
ﬁrms, during the second half of the 20
th century. We indicate that the continuous
increases in population, and thus in the market size of this sector, will play a fundamental
role in explaining these phenomena. We also argue that population and market size can
be endogenously determined by drugs through the impact of drugs over the mortality
rate. Hence, these two eﬀects reinforce each other, producing decrements in the mortality
rate and increments in the stock of drugs over time.
We obtained the set of new molecular entities approved by the FDA during the second
half of the the 20
th century and we decomposed the data in a panel of 15 therapeutic cat-
egories over time. Using this data, we tested our hypotheses using diﬀerent econometric
methods (FE, GLS, IV, Tobit). The results support the hypothesis and are consistent
across methods.
The results indicate that an exogenous increase in market size increases initially the
number of new drugs. It is notable how this eﬀect is ampliﬁed through the feedback
∗I received helpful comments from Gary Becker, Fabian Lange, Kevin Murphy, Tomas Philipson and
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen. The usual disclaimer applies.
1eﬀect of drugs over the mortality rate. In the long run, the initial increase on drugs and
market size are both ampliﬁed in 25 per cent.
1 Introduction
The sustained increase of expenditures in health care over the 20th century brought the cost of
health and its ﬁnance to the top of the policy agenda. The determinants of health expenditure
is thus an important topic.
One of the factors that seems to aﬀect health expenditure is technological change, e.g.
new treatments. Newhouse (1992), using an accounting analysis, attributed large part of
the increase in health expenditures -in the U.S. over the second half of the last century- to
technological change. Cutler and McClellan (1996) studied the growth of expenditure on
heart attack treatment and found that large part of the increase on expenditure was due to
new technologies and their diﬀusions.
Technological change in the medical sector includes new procedures such as endoscopies,
transplantations or renal dialysis but also advances on products such as new drugs. This paper
will focus on this last type of technological change, e.g. new drugs. Drugs is an important item
in the cost of health as they represent almost 10 per cent of total U.S. health expenditure in
2000. Further, prescription drugs is also a rapid growing item as it grew from 23.500 millions
of 1983 dollars in 1991 to 42.700 millions of 1983 dollars in 2000 1.
A direct measure of technological change in the drug sector is the introduction of new
drugs. Data on introduction of drugs during the second half of the 20th century can be
1source: the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/nhe-oact/
2obtained from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Since the implementation of
the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the FDA must approve all new drugs before they
might be available to the public. This property of the US law allows us to reconstruct the
history of new drugs in the US health market. Figure 1 shows the evolution of new molecules
approvals over the period 1940-1997. The series shows a sustained increased in new drugs
over time, except during the period 1955-65. This unique change of trend during this period
might be the result of changes in the legislation. In fact between 1938 and 1962, any drug
seeking approval from the FDA needed to show that it was a safe drug while starting on 1962,
an additional requirement for a new drug approval is to show its eﬃcacy on its therapeutical
treatment.
[Insert ﬁgure 1]
This paper will focus in explaining this observed trend on the introduction of new drugs.
A novelty of the paper is that it proposes two main interactions that reinforce each other
allowing continuous increases on the stock of drugs and continuous decrements on mortality
rate. The ﬁrst element playing a role is the relationship between the creation of new drugs
and the size of the health market. A larger size of the health market is associated with a
larger number of drugs that producers would like to have available for marketing purposes.
In fact a larger market size, holding constant the number of drugs, should be associated with
larger proﬁts per drug, which provide incentives for new ﬁrms to enter the market throughout
the creation of new drugs.
A second interaction proposed on the paper is a feedback eﬀect of the stock of drugs over
the mortality rate. Intuitively, as diﬀerent drugs are available to the public, a larger number
of diseases may be attacked and mortality rates might decrease. In this case market size is
3positively aﬀected because population size becomes larger. This second relationship produces
a feedback eﬀect that reinforces any initial increase on the number of drugs. For instance
consider an exogenous increase on population, holding per capita income constant. Health
market size will rise and there will be a larger introduction of drugs and thus a larger stock of
drugs. This larger stock of drugs will provide a lower mortality rate that aﬀects population
and will increase the size of the health market. Hence, a virtuous circle or a multiplier eﬀect
in the creation of drugs will occur.
To address those eﬀects, the paper presents a model that discusses the determinants of
drugs’ introductions. The model deals in one hand with households that purchase health goods
(drugs) to extend the expected life span of their members. On another hand, we consider
pharmaceutical ﬁrms that introduce new drugs into the market as result of a research and
development (RND) process. Those ﬁrms decide the moment to introduce new drugs by
evaluating economic incentives. We initially show that the health market size is an important
determinant of drugs’ introduction. Later we show that a larger stock of drugs is associated
with a lower death likelihood and thus with a lower mortality rate.
A second characteristic of the paper is the empirical design here developed. To analyze the
eﬀect of the market size over the creation of new drugs, we examine a panel of 15 therapeutic
categories of drugs over the period 1950-1997. We use diﬀerent methods to disentangle the
eﬀect. First, we use the method of ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) to deal with unobserved heterogeneity
among therapeutic categories of drugs and we obtain estimates using within-drug variation.
We also provide estimations adding-up between-drug variation by using the GLS method.
Later, we estimate using Tobit regressions to deal with the fact that our left hand side
variable is censored at zero.
4Those methods do not deal with the potential simultaneity that might exist between mar-
ket size and drugs, since we postulate that the stock of drugs might aﬀect mortality rates (and
thus market size). To disentangle the eﬀect of market size over the introduction of drugs, we
need some instrument correlated with market size but uncorrelated with unobservable factors
that aﬀect the introduction of drugs. To accomplish this task, we construct expected market
size by projecting population in a 10-year horizon. We use this instrument because expected
market size should be correlated with observed market size (up to some forecast errors) but
uncorrelated with new drugs, since projected mortality rates used on the construction of the
index, does not include the information on new drugs. Using this instrument we provide
additional estimates of the same methods used above.
To test the second hypothesis of the paper, e.g. the eﬀect of the stock of drugs over
mortality rates, we estimate a production function for mortality rates across causes of death.
The production function depends on inputs and technology where inputs are approximated
by health expenditure, and technology depends on the stock of drugs available in the health
market. We provide estimations of GLS and FE methods. Then to address potential simul-
taneity on drugs, we ﬁrst diﬀerentiate the data and we instrument drugs. We ﬁnd that the
eﬀect of the stock of drugs is negative and signiﬁcant.
The remainder of this paper is developed in the following way. Section 2 provides a review
of contributions related with the principal topics of the paper while section 3 describes the
theoretical setup of the paper. Section 4 shows that health market size is a main determinant
of the number of drugs available in the health sector. Section 5 characterizes the evolution of
the economy and it shows a virtuous circle on the health market that allows lower mortality
rate and larger number of drugs over time. Section 6 describes the econometric approach of
5the paper and it describes the data set used in this paper. Section 7 presents and discusses
the results while section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper links inventions on the pharmaceutical sector with population by emphasizing a
simultaneity between market size and new drugs.
This relationship has not been largely explored in the literature. However, there is a recent
contribution in the topic by Geoﬀard and Philipson (2002). They stressed these eﬀects by
analyzing goods for which the extent of consumption aﬀects its duration. They argue that
the feedback eﬀect from larger longevity aﬀect RND decisions through market size.
The literature does not provide empirical estimates of this simultaneous relationship be-
tween drugs and market size. However, there are contributions that examine separately (1)
the determinants of RND on the pharmaceutical sector and (2) the eﬀect of drugs over life
expectancy. As those topics are treated separately in the literature, we initially provide a
review of the contributions on the ﬁrst topic. Later, we indicate the main results of the
literature when analyzing the eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates.
With the 1962 amendment to the ”Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act”, researchers found it
necessary to discuss the determinants of inventions in this sector to determine the true impact
of the amendment in the structure of pharmaceutical innovations.
Among the structural factors that aﬀect research and development, the literature stresses
market size, past cash ﬂow of ﬁrms, and research productivity. Peltzman (1973) provided a
simple model that explained the introduction of drugs as a function of lagged market size.
6Using a time-series analysis over the period 1948-62 (annual data), he found a strong positive
eﬀect of market size over the introduction of drugs. In his analysis, the 1962 amendment
would have had a signiﬁcant and negative impact over drugs introduced after 1962. Vernon
and Gusen (1974) related the introduction of new chemical entities (new drugs) with the
size of the ﬁrm -rather than the size of the market- and they found that a larger ﬁrm would
introduce, holding everything constant, more drugs.
Grabowski (1968) focused on explaining research and development of the American chem-
ical, drug, and petroleum industries. He used variables (after-tax proﬁts, number of patents
per scientist, diversiﬁcation index) that aﬀect the expected returns from RND -rather than
market size directly-. He found that these variables have a positive and signiﬁcant impact
over RND. Grabowski and Vernon (1981) emphasized the role of past cash ﬂow as inputs on
the process of RND in the pharmaceutical sector. They argued that the impact of the 1962
amendment had a dynamically negative eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s proﬁts and RND. A more recent
study is the one of Lichtenberg (1998a) about the allocation of publicly-funded biomedical re-
search. He found that research funding should increase with disease incidence. Thus diseases
aﬀecting a larger number of individuals, which is a concept linked to market size, should have
larger public research funds.
There is also some evidence on the eﬀect of drugs over the mortality are and life expectancy.
Lichtenberg (1998b) related the introduction of new drugs with an increase in life expectancy.
Using cross-section data on diseases for two diﬀerent periods (1970-80 and 1980-91), he found
that the introduction of new drugs increased life expectancy by about 0.75-1.0 per cent per
annum. Lichtenberg (2002) explained life expectancy by using a times-series analysis over the
second half of the 20th century in the U.S. The long run elasticity of longevity, with respect to
7the number of new drugs approved, is signiﬁcant and near 0.03. Lastly in Lichtenberg (2001),
he analyzed the eﬀects of drugs on mortality from rare diseases and HIV. New drugs, and
especially drugs developed through the orphan drug act of 1983, show an important impact
on reducing mortality from those diseases.
Thus the literature links inventions on the pharmaceutical sector with diﬀerent measures
of rate of return -including market size- and there is also some initial evidence of the positive
impact of drugs over life expectancy. Notice that in general those studies (1) do not consider
the interaction between drugs and population and (2) use only time-series evidence or cross-
section evidence with a small data set. This paper will speciﬁcally link population and drugs
in its theoretical section and it will provide evidence of those eﬀects in its empirical section.
This section uses a panel data on 15 therapeutic categories of drugs over the period 1950-
1997 to provide evidence of the eﬀect of market size in the introduction of drugs. It also
uses instrumental variables to control the simultaneity problem as indicated above. When
considering the eﬀect of drugs over mortality rate, we use a similar panel to disentangle the
eﬀects.
3 The Environment
In this section we describe the theoretical setup used on the paper. In this economy, time is
continuous. There is a representative household that maximizes its expected utility by ex-
tending the lifespan of their members -which will be assumed to depend on drug consumption.
Pharmaceutical ﬁrms invent drugs and obtain the monopoly right to sell them. The problems
of individuals and ﬁrms, plus the market clearing conditions of this economy are described
8next.
3.1 The households
We describe now the problem of the representative household. The household has Nt members
at time t. Each member of the household faces only two possible states: (1) being alive or (2)
dead. If she is alive, she obtains an utility level equals to u1 while if she is dead she gets u0,
where we assume both utility levels are constants with the property: u1 >u0=0. Let λ(  ht)
be the fraction of the household members that die, where   ht is the health level of a member
of the household and the subscript t indicates time. This health level will depend on total
health goods purchased and consumed by each individual. Also, there are ntNt individuals
born at t, where nt is fertility rate. We will assume that fertility rate is constant:
Assumption 1:nt = n,∀t
The total ﬂow of utility in the household at t is u1Nt, which is the utility per member
alive times the size of the household. Hence, we can deﬁne the household’s expected welfare










ns−λ(  hs)ds dt (1)
Where ρ is the household’s constant discount rate, e
  t
0
λ(  hs)ds is the survival density func-
tion and the level of population at time t=0 was normalized to one. Notice that the inclusion
9of population in the setup is analogous to the inclusion of a non constant discount factor as
in Becker and Mulligan (1997). Hence, the ”modiﬁed” discount factor depends on the rate
ρ and population growth rate. The basic properties of the utility function U will be λh < 0
and λhh > 0, where the second property is required to satisfy second order conditions 2.
The production function that determines   ht depends on two factors: (1) a larger expendi-
ture on health, (2) new drugs (technologies). The ﬁrst factor indicates that all things being
equal, a larger expenditure on treatments should provide a better result on an individuals’
health. The second factor indicates that new technologies might provide alternative solutions
for disease not yet controlled or might provide advance solutions for diseases that already have
some treatment. Mortality rates could also be aﬀected by others factors -such as nutrition
and/or health public policy-, however those eﬀects will be omitted in this analysis.
To introduce these ideas into our setup, we will follow the approach of Spence (1976) and
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). They introduce symmetrical and concave preferences that produce
a taste for variety on goods consumed. As in their case, health level will depend not only
on the total quantity of health goods (drugs in our case) consumed but also on the number
of diﬀerent drugs consumed. To formalize the argument, let’s assume that there are Mt
drugs available at time t. As a matter of notation, each good will be indexed by i, where i
∈{ 1,....,Mt} and let per capita quantity consumed of drug i at t be hit. The total health
level   h will be speciﬁed as:









10Notice that this function implies that mortality rate will be negatively aﬀected by per
capita consumption of each drug and also by the number of drugs. When ε = 1, the CES
function becomes total drug consumption, e.g. the sum of the consumption of each of the
drugs. In that case, drugs are simply perfect substitutes between each other and we might
obtain a solution where only one type of drugs is consumed. In practice, drugs with similar
therapeutical use might be used as substitutes but drugs with diﬀerent therapeutical cannot
be considered as substitutes. Thus we will allow some degree of substitution but we will rule
out extreme cases. To avoid such cases, we will assume 0 <ε<1. Ruling out the perfect
substitutes and the leontief cases, we assure interior solutions for the consumption of each
drug.
We will next discuss the budget constraint of the household. The timing of the problem
is the following. At the beginning of each period, the household is endowed with some level
of capital stock (assets), which is carried over from the previous period, Kt. Assets are used
on a linear household’s production function to obtain some physical output: yt=BKt, where
yt is physical output and B>0 is a constant parameter. The physical output can be stored
and used as assets, which then can be carried over to the next period of time, or be sold by
the household to obtain income. Once income is obtained, the household purchases drugs at
the market price Pit, where Pit is measured in terms of physical goods. It should be noted
that the capital stock depreciates at a rate of δ> 0. Hence, the household budget constraint
at time t is the following:
˙ K = BKt − Nt
Mt  
i=0
Pithit − Ktδ (3)
11Notice that with the above budget constraint, we are multiplying per capita consumption
of drug i by the size of the household to obtain the total health expenditure of the household
on the ith drug.
There is also a borrowing condition that must be imposed. This is the usual transversality
condition that rules ineﬃcient accumulation of capital stock. It indicates that at the end of
the planning horizon of the household there would not be valuable assets left. To state the
condition, let µt be the shadow price of household’s assets at time t. The condition is:
lim
t→∞
Ktµt = 0 (4)
To sum up, a household chooses per capita purchases of each of the drugs available,
{ hit}
i=0,...,Mt
t=0,...∞ , to maximize (1) subject to (2)-(3)-(4), and the fact that hit should be non
negatives. In this problem, the household faces prices as well as the number of drugs available
over time, Mt.
3.2 The pharmaceutical ﬁrms
The drugs purchased by the household are produced by pharmaceutical ﬁrms that must ﬁnd
economic incentives prior to introducing new drugs into the market. Thus the number of
drugs, Mt, is endogenous. The ﬁrms engage in RND processes which provide inventions -new
drugs. It is assumed that each ﬁrm produces only one drug. The economic incentives on the
pharmaceutical sector are based on perpetual monopoly rights obtained to produce and sell
the new drugs.
12The timing for a pharmaceutical ﬁrm’s problem is the following. Initially, a ﬁrm must
decide if it will engage in developing a new product at a cost of η units of the physical good.
This invention cost is paid completely during one period of time. There is certainty in the
output of the RND process. As a result, a ﬁrm that spends η units of the physical good will
obtain a new design. This design will be used to produce a drug that is not currently available
on the market.
The production process for a ﬁrm with a new design is the following. Physical goods
produced by a household are used as a unique input for the production of the drug. This
input enters the production process with the only modiﬁcation being its inclusion within the
design. The result being the drug that is sold in the market. The material cost will remain for
each subsequent period, while the use of the design for each subsequent period no longer has
a cost. We will assume that the drug’s production function is linear in relation to the input
as in: hit=Dyd
it, where yd
it is the amount of physical goods used as input on the production
process of drug i at time t. The parameter D is a constant technology parameter and it
satisﬁes D>0.
There is free entry into the pharmaceutical sector. For example, if the present value of
proﬁts for a ﬁrm i, Vi
t, is bigger than η, an inﬁnite amount of resources will be devoted to the
sector at time t. In the same way, if Vi
t is smaller than η, no resources will be devoted to the
sector at all. As a result, Vi
t will be equal to η on equilibrium.
With this description, we are able to set up a problem that enables the ﬁrm to decide the
moment of market entrance as well as the drug’s unit price. It should be noted that once
the ﬁrm enters into the market, they will need to reevaluate their unit price decision for each
period of time.












r(s)ds = η (5)
Where Hiz(Piz) is the aggregated demand for drug i and r(z) is the interest rate of the
economy at time z. In the above zero-proﬁt condition, the marginal cost of production is 1/D.
In order to characterize the price decision for the ﬁrm, we must obtain the current demand
function faced by the ﬁrms. Notice that the household utility function is separable on the con-
sumption of drugs over time. This property allows us to solve the problem for the household,
conditional on having the total health expenditure. With that we may obtain the demand
functions for each drug. Later we aggregate over individuals to obtain aggregated demand
faced by the monopolist. With this information, we can solve the monopolist problem.












Where Eht is total health expenditure per capita at time t. By solving this problem, we

















14When the number of drugs -Mt- is large, the price decision is Pit = 1
Dε,∀ i,t. Notice that
this result allows us to conclude that the household will choose hit = hjt,∀i,j since health
goods enter symmetrically on the utility function. These results are standard in the literature
-see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, pag. 231-233)- and they will be used later.
It should be noted that we must also determine the number of drugs over time, Mt.T h e
second variable that characterizes the pharmaceutical sector will be analyzed later.
To completely describe the economy, the next subsection indicates the market clearing
conditions that must hold on any equilibrium. Next we provide a deﬁnition of this equilibrium
for our economy.
3.3 The equilibrium
In this economy, there are Mt+1 markets: Mt markets for drugs plus the physical good
market. All these markets must clear. Once we impose the market clearing conditions and we
satisfy the household and the ﬁrm’s problem, we can deﬁne the equilibrium in this economy.
Next we determine the market clearing conditions.
To satisfy the market clearing conditions on drugs, we impose that for any drug i, total





(λ(  hs)−ns)ds = Hit,i =1 ,......,Mt (8)
Where Hit is the total supply of health good i at time t. Hence, the right hand side of
the condition is the supply of good i at time t, determined by the i’s monopolist. The left
15hand side is the total amount consumed by households, that can be decomposed on per capita
health consumption of good i at time t, hit, and population size, Nt.
In the same way, the market of the physical good must also clear. As indicated above,
this good can be used as (1) input in the production of the health goods, as (2) asset to be
carried to next period and as (3) investment on RND. Hence it must hold the following:







Where Yt is total production of physical good and It is aggregated investment on assets
(including depreciation). The dot indicates time diﬀerentiation; hence the ﬁrst term on the
right hand side indicates total investment on RND and the summation indicates the total
amount of physical good used as inputs in the production of health ﬁrms. The equilibrium
will be deﬁned next.
Deﬁnition of equilibrium: The equilibrium of the economy consists of a set of households
demand functions {hit}
i=0...Mt
t=0...∞, a set of health prices {Pit}
i=0...Mt




t=0...∞, and the evolution of the number of drugs {Mt}t=0...∞, such that:
1. Households solve their problems.
2. Pharmaceutical ﬁrms solve their problems.
3. Market clearing conditions hold.
164 The role of market size
This section will focus on the determinants of drug inventions. We will show that market
size determine the introduction of new drugs. Market size will depend on population and per
capita income that aﬀects per capita demand for drugs. Thus any change on these components
will aﬀect RND. The argument follows the pharmaceutical ﬁrm’s decision to introduce a new
drug. Consider an exogenous increase on market size -due to a larger population or per capita
income. As a result, aggregated demand for pharmaceutical goods will raise and incumbent
ﬁrms will have positive proﬁts, thus Vi
t >ηfor any ﬁrm i at time t. Those positive proﬁts
provide incentives for new ﬁrms to enter to the drug market (by the zero-proﬁt condition),
and therefore new drugs become available.
To clarify the point notice that since consumers purchase the same amount of each health















r(s)ds = η (10)
where Ht is deﬁned as
 Mt
i=0 Hit, the total quantity of drugs purchased by households at
the current prices while (1-ε)/Dε is the markup obtained by each ﬁrm. We should diﬀerentiate









17This is an arbitrage condition of an entrant ﬁrm into the pharmaceutical sector -thus an
arbitrage condition to introduce a new drug. It states that the ﬁrm is willing to postpone
its entry to the market for a period of time if the loss in marginal beneﬁt equals the gain of
avoiding the RND cost for one period. The left hand side is the gain of producing the good,
as (1-ε)/Dε is the markup and Ht/Mt is the quantity sold by the ﬁrm if its operates. (each
ﬁrm on the market has the same share since they charge the same price and face the same
demand function). The right hand side is the ﬁnancial gain of postponing the entry.
When the interest rate is stationary over time -we will show below that this is the case-,
the right hand side of the arbitrage condition is constant and so must the left hand side.
Notice that using market clearing conditions on the drug market, the aggregated amount








hit is total per capita consumption of drugs. The condition indicates that
the total amount of drugs sold by the industry -Ht-, which is a measure of market size, can
be decomposed on (1) total per capita consumption of drugs and (2) population. This simple
decomposition provides an interesting conclusion in relation with the introduction of drugs.
The arbitrage condition implies that a larger market size, due to a larger population size
or a larger per capita expenditure on drugs, is associated with the introduction of new drugs
into the drug market.
So far we have shown that a larger market size is associated with more drugs. It is of
18great importance to notice that there exists a feedback eﬀect though. As drugs decrease
the mortality rate, there will be an increase in population growth and thus market size.
Therefore we have a mutual dependency that reinforces endogenously the creation of new
drugs through sustained decrements on the mortality rate while providing for the increase of
population. Next section will describe this relationship.
5 The behavior of the economy
This section will describe the behavior of the economy over time. We will show that mortality
rate and the stock of drugs have opposite and sustained trends, as the stock of drugs rises
the mortality rate decreases continuously over time.
To characterize the economy, the following assumption will be stated:
Assumption 2:n<ρ<B− δ
We stated this assumption because it assures the utility function to be bounded and the
transversality condition satisﬁed - see mathematical appendix.
We will analyze ﬁrst the dynamics of the household. Notice that the household’s problem








+ µt[(B − δ)Kt − NtPht]
19Where the above Hamiltonian replaces ht =
Mt  
i=0
hit. We work with total per capita amount
of drugs purchased, ht, rather than with the amount purchased per drug, hit, because the
utility function is symmetrical on drugs, and prices are the same for each drug. Thus the
ﬁrst order conditions are the same for any drug. Hence we will condense the information on













The left hand side is the marginal beneﬁt of an additional unit of per capita drug consumed




t is the change
on mortality rate when we increase the consumption of drugs. Thus the left hand side is a
total change on utility. The right hand side indicates that the cost depends on the price of
drugs P, the size of household -the household spends the same per capita amount on each of
its members- and on the shadow price of capital -µt-.
A second condition characterizing the household’s problem is:
˙ µ
µ
= −rt = −(B − δ) (13)
This condition is an arbitrage condition on capital stock. It indicates that the capital gain
of holding a unit of capital,
˙ µ
µ, plus its rental must be equal to zero. If the capital gain plus
rental rate of capital stock was positive (negative) there would be incentives to accumulate
a larger (smaller) stock of capital. As such this condition determines the expansion path
20of capital over time. Notice that interest rate is constant over time and depends on the
parameter of the model.
We may obtain some additional information by diﬀerentiating equation (12) with respect



















t ht) < 0 by second order conditions. This coef-
ﬁcient, σλ, is a coeﬃcient of risk aversion on health as it measures concavity on the survival
density function.
Equation (14) indicates that the evolution of per capita drug consumption depends on two
components, (1) the diﬀerence between interest rate and discount factor and (2) the growth
rate of the stock of drugs.
If the rental rate is bigger than ρ, individuals are willing to postpone current expenditure
on drugs to accumulate larger capital stock. In that case, future resources and future per
capita drug expenditure rises.
The eﬀect of the growth rate of drugs depends on the the sign of (1 + σλ). Intuitively,
there are two eﬀects when the growth rate of drugs rises: (1) an income and (2) a substitution
eﬀect. A larger growth rate of drugs is associated with a larger future stock of drugs. As the
future number of drugs rises, it is easier to attain a given level of mortality rate. We may
reallocate resources away from future drug expenditure (this is the income eﬀect). We do
have a second eﬀect though. As there is a large stock of drugs in the future, there are more
21incentives to increase future drug expenditure because its return -eﬀect over the mortality
rate- is larger in the future (this is the substitution eﬀect). We will assume that σλ < −1a n d
thus per capita health expenditure, ht, decreases if the stock of drugs rises.
We will next characterize the evolution of drugs. From the arbitrage condition that char-
acterizes the entry decisions of ﬁrms into the drug market -equation (11)-, we know that the
number of drugs will follow the evolution of market size. Thus to determine the evolution of
Mt over time we will focus on the dynamics of market size. The above market size is deﬁned
as:






Diﬀerentiating this expression over time we get a ﬁrst approximation for the growth rate
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Where ε − (1 + σλ) >0a n dλ = λ(M
1−ε
ε
t ht). This equation shows that the growth
22rate of drugs depends on two components: (1) the diﬀerence between rental rate and time
preferences3 and (2) population growth rate. In fact, if rental rate is larger than the discount
factor, individuals are willing to accumulate more resources, that can be spent in the future.
Therefore future demand for health at the per capita level rises. The second component
indicates that a larger population growth rate is associated with a larger increase on the drug
market size. This provides incentives for the ﬁrms to engage in RND and provide more drugs.
We may also characterize the evolution of mortality rate over time. Using equations (14),
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t ht) < 0 is the elasticity of mortality rate with respect to an increase
on   ht.
The equation indicates that the mortality rate is negatively aﬀected by population growth
rate and by the diﬀerence between rental rate and the constant discount factor, ρ.T h e
intuition is the following. Consider ﬁrst the case of positive population growth rate. In that
case, the economy has a drug market size growing over time and therefore the stock of drugs
rises continuously. This continuous increase in the stock of drugs produces lower mortality
rates. The eﬀect of a larger rental rate of the economy compared to ρ follows the same
argument. The intuition in this case is that individuals are willing to postpone current drug
consumption to accumulate resources that are spent in the future. As a result, there is the
3Which is positive by assumption 2
23continuous demand increase per capita for drugs. This causes the eﬀect over market size, and
the introduction of new drugs.
Notice that equations (17) and (18) are a system of two equations that describe the
evolution of drugs and mortality rate over time. We will next provide an example of the
evolution of drugs and the mortality rate. This example does not intend to calibrate the
economy but only to provide a feeling of the behavior of the variables. Hence, we will choose
some parameters that only satisfy the restrictions imposed above, but they do not need to
replicate any observation from the economy.






σ , where σ = −0.5 and thus σλ = −1.5,η σ = −0.5. Further we will assume that
ε =0 .5,r t −δ =0 .04,ρ=0 .01,n=0 .05. The initial level of mortality rate is set equal to the
exogenous fertility rate while the initial level of drugs is ﬁxed at an arbitrary level, M0 >0.
Figure 2 characterizes the evolution of the economy under those assumptions.
[Insert ﬁgure 2]
The ﬁgure shows sustained trends in both variables as we expected. The number of drugs
grow at an exponential rate while mortality rate presents smaller decrements over time.
6 The data
We next provide empirical evidence to the eﬀects stressed above: (1) the impact of market
size over the creation of drugs and (2) the eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates.
To disentangle these eﬀects, we use information on drugs from 15 diﬀerent therapeutic
categories over time. We also construct alternative measures of market size per therapeu-
24tic category by approximating total purchasing power of individuals buying drugs. We are
weighting diﬀerent measures of purchasing power by age using prevalence rates. Additionally,
we obtain data on government funds used on the RND process of the pharmaceutical sector.
This last variable is used as an additional control on the equation determining the eﬀect of
market size over drug creation. This section describes this data.
6.1 Drugs
The data on drugs was obtained from the FDA by using a freedom of information request.
We obtained a list of all new drugs approved since 1939. Each record is composed by the
trade name of the drug, the approval date, the chemical type, and the generic name of the
drug among other possible categories.
The chemical type of a drug has 7 possible classiﬁcations, which are:
1. New molecular entity, active ingredient that has never been marketed in the U.S.
2. New derivative, a chemical derived from an active ingredient already marketed
3. New formulation, a new dosage or new formulation of an active ingredient already
marketed
4. New combination, a drug that contains two or more compounds, the combination of
which has not been marketed together in a product
5. Already marketed product but a new manufacturer
6. Already marketed product, but a new use
7. Already marketed legally without an FDA approval
We will follow the empirical literature and focus on new molecular entities (NME) only. In
fact, the rest of chemical types correspond to drugs that were derived from molecular entities
25already on the market. Hence we will not classify them as new drugs. We found 1135 NME
approved between 1939 and 1997. These are going to be used in our analysis.
To construct the panel of drugs, we use its generic name. This information allows us
to determine its therapeutical use. Therapeutical use indicates the type of disease the drug
deals with. The therapeutic use was determined by consulting the 9th edition of the Drug
Information Handbook (DIH) published by Lexi-Comp and the American Pharmaceutical
Association. This DIH is similar to a pharmaceutical dictionary as it provides an alphabetic
list of drugs in the market by generic name (U.S. adopted name). Each drug listed on the DIH
has information about its therapeutical category, its use, its contraindications, and adverse
reactions among other ﬁelds.
We have classiﬁed the drugs into 15 diﬀerent categories (column 1 of table 1) . We
chose these categories based on the 1995 National Drug Classiﬁcation (NDC). Among these
categories we ﬁnd antidotes, hematologic drugs, cardiovascular-renal drugs, etc..
[Insert table 1]
To classify the drugs over time, we used the approval date on each record to obtain the
year the drug was approved for marketing purposes.
Using this information, we obtained a list of drugs classiﬁed in 15 diﬀerent therapeutic
categories over the period of 1939 to 1997.
6.2 Mortality rates
We constructed a series on mortality rates for each of the 15 therapeutic categories. To do
so, we matched each of these therapeutic categories to a set of causes of death. We used the
9th version of the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD-9) to determine the matching
26process between death and drugs. This classiﬁcation ranges from 1 to 999, where each number
is associated with a cause of death. This ICD-9 classiﬁcation allows us to match each death
with one of the drug categories. To see the way we match deaths and drugs, refer to table 1.
To construct the mortality series, we use the U.S. National Mortality Detail Files (NMDF)
publicly available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR) over the period 1968-1997. The NMDFs have a record per each death occurred on
the U.S. during each year. The record includes the cause of death, which is determined by
the ICD-9. Using this information, we are able to construct mortality series by therapeutic
category from 1968 to 1997.
6.3 Market size
To ﬁgure out the size of the market for each of the drug categories, we construct two alternative
measures of market size. Each measure will construct market size by using population and
individuals’ income. We implement this strategy because a larger population is associated
with a larger market size. Also we use per capita income because a larger per capita income
allows a larger expenditure on drugs at the individual level. Thus we link market size with
purchasing power of the population in the economy.
The two measures diﬀer on the deﬁnition of income. The ﬁrst measure uses current median
income of individuals while the second uses an index of permanent income we develop later.
Another qualiﬁcation with respect to the construction of market size is that we obtained
data on population and income by age-groups over time. We use this strategy because individ-
uals might change their consumption of drugs during their lifecycles. In fact, we expect that
older individuals will spend more on drugs and medical procedures than younger individuals,
27everything else being equal. As a result we will give more importance to older individuals
when constructing market size.
From the U.S statistical abstract, we obtained data on the populations of diﬀerent age-
groups since 1950 to 1997. The groups in this paper are individuals aged 25 to 34, 35 to 44,
45 to 54, 55 to 64, and 65 and older. In addition to population, we obtained data on the
U.S. median income for people in each of these groups at 1997 CPI adjusted dollars from the
Current Population Reports of the Census. By multiplying population and median income
at each age-group, we obtained the purchasing power in each respective age-group.
To construct the size of the market, we will add-up the purchasing power of those groups
by using appropriated weights for each of them. The obvious weights to be used are prevalence
rates. A group with larger prevalence rate in a given disease, has relatively more individuals
aﬀected with the disease and should consume more treatments, relative to groups with lower
prevalence rates.
We obtained a proxy for prevalence rates by using the National Mortality Detail Files. In
fact, each record on the NMDF provides the age of the individual that died. This information
allows us to classify each death on one of our age groups. Next, to determine the prevalence
rate per age-group for a given disease, we use the set of individuals dying of a speciﬁc disease.
We determine the fraction of individuals dying per age-group and we divide by the total











it is the weight -proxy for prevalence rate- of age-group J on disease i at time t
and jit is an indicator function equal to one if the record indicates that the individual died
from disease type i at t and zero otherwise.
Consider the following example of prevalence rates for hematologic drugs. These drugs are
related directly with diseases of the blood, which are the ones encoded between 280 and 290
on the ICD-9 code. Thus the prevalence rate of individuals aged 65 and older is deﬁned as
the total number of individuals aged 65 and older who died of blood diseases, over the total
number of individual who died of the same diseases.









Where MKSit is market size per therapeutic category over time while popJ
it,yJ
it are total
population and median individual income of age-group J at t.
The above index measures market size using current income. We develop next a second
measure that uses permanent income instead. This measure follows the same basic con-
struction as the one shown in equation (21), but uses permanent income rather than current
income.












t,E t indicate permanent income and expectation at t respectively while R = 1
1+r -r
is interest rate- an d yz is current income. The date t is the date the individual enters to the
labor market while T is the number of years the individual works and obtains income. We
set T=40 years.
As in Flavin (1981) and Deaton (1992), we assume that income follows an autoregressive







We use this expression to approximate permanent income. We estimated α using per
capita income annual data over the period 1929 to 1999 obtained from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis. We construct a series of permanent income over the period 1929 to 1997
by using the point estimate, α =1 .018, setting r=0.05 and y0 = 1 in 1929.
Using permanent income, we construct an alternative measure of market size:










it is permanent income of age-group J at t.
4In the literature on consumption and permanent income, there are diﬀerent autoregressive processes. These
processes depend on some assumption about the stationarity of income. Deaton (1992) provides a discussion
about the change on permanent income and consumption if the income process is diﬀerence-stationary or
trend-stationary. Here, I will follow Flavin (1981) assuming an AR process on income.
306.4 Government grants on pharmaceutical research
A variable that may have inﬂuence on RND is government grants for medical research. We
obtain data on government grants for medical research from the National Health Institutes
(NIH) almanac over the period 1948 to 1997. The NIH is composed by diﬀerent institutes
which provides funds for private research within the pharmaceutical sector. Among them,
we ﬁnd the National Cancer Institute (NCI), the National Hearth, Lung and Blood Institute
(NHLBI), the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), etc...
We compute government expenditure in each of the therapeutic categories by mapping
expenditure on a speciﬁc institute with a speciﬁc therapeutic category. The way we mapped
the government expenditures can be seen on table 2. In the table, there are some centers
whose grants were divided between diseases because they cannot be directly mapped with
a unique disease. An example is the case of the NHLBI whose grants were divided among
hematologic, cardiovascular-renal and respiratory tract drugs.
[Insert table 2]
6.5 Expenditure on hospital bed per therapeutic category
When explaining mortality rates across therapeutic categories, we will have as a control the
expenditure on medical treatments. We will assume that mortality rates are determined by a
production function which depends on technology (number of drugs) and inputs (expenditure
on medical treatments).
To approximate expenditure in medical treatments by therapeutical category, we obtained
data on total hospital beds use at national level per annum. We compute the data by ther-
apeutic category over the period 1980 to 1997 from the National Hospital Discharge Survey
31(NHDS).
Next, we construct real expenditure on hospital beds per therapeutic category. We mul-
tiply total hospital beds per therapeutic category by the price index ”hospital and related
services” (obtained from the bureau of labor statistics) and divide it by CPI. This variable
will be used as a proxy variable for real health expenditure per therapeutic category.
6.6 Some initial evidence of the eﬀect of market size
Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of new molecular entities approved by FDA compared
with the growth rate of the population of individuals aged 45 to 64 years old, and 65 years
and older in the US over the period 1955-1997. The ﬁgures show a very similar evolution of
population and drugs approved over time. As we expected, there is an increase in market size
due to a larger population as associated with the introduction of new drugs by pharmaceutical
ﬁrms.
[Insert ﬁgures 3 and 4]
Even when the evolution of these series are quite similar, some qualiﬁcations seem to be in
place. First, the aggregated time-series shown above might not be the most relevant measure
of drug inventions when related to market size. Drugs might have diﬀerent therapeutical uses
and thus diﬀerent drugs might be related to consumers at diﬀerent stages of their lifecycle.
Thus drugs used intensively by elderly individuals, such as Alzheimer’s drugs, will have a
diﬀerent market size compared to ophthalmic, otologic or skin related drugs.
To expand on this concept, we will next focus on analyzing the relationship between
market size and drugs across therapeutic categories. Figures 5 to 7 plot the number of drugs
(vertical axis) versus market size (using current income) measured in thousands of billions of
32dollars (horizontal axis) for the therapeutic categories considered on this paper. The ﬁgures
show a clear positive association between market size and number of drugs.
[Insert ﬁgures 5 to 7]
Even when ﬁgures 5 and 7 present a clear association between drugs and market size,
this association might be the result of simple spurious correlation between series measured in
levels. We would rather focus on the relation of the ﬂow of drugs and market size (and other
sources of demand such as government expenditure).
Table 3 reports summary statistics of the data. The table shows that there exists a
large variation on the average creation of drugs across therapeutic categories. The table also
shows that therapeutic categories with a larger creation of drugs are associated with a larger
government expenditure on research grants. This is the case of the National Cancer Institute
which is related with oncolytic drugs, the National Institute of Mental Health or the National
Health, Lungs and Blood Institute which are related with the central nervous system and
cardiovascular-renal drugs respectively. Conversely, therapeutic categories presenting lower
creation of drugs present lower government expenditure on research. This is the case of the
National Institute of Deafness and Other Communications Disorders or the National Institute
of Arthritis, Musculoskeletal and Skin Disease.
[Insert table 3]
Figures 8 to 10 present plots of 10-years moving averages of ﬂow of drugs and market size
per therapeutic categories. We use these moving averages to emphasize long run trends in
the data. A positive relationship between the creation of drugs and the size of the market
can be observed. The relationship varies across therapeutic categories being clearly stronger
33in neurologic, cardiovascular-renal, nutrients, respiratory and immunologic drugs. We ﬁnd
three exceptions: Ophthalmic, pain relief and hormone drugs. These do not present a clear
relationship with market size. However, while hormone drugs present a smaller market size
yet receive a larger government expenditure on research compared to other therapeutic drugs.
Hence in this last case, we may argue that the more relevant measure of demand might be
government expenditure. We can infer that the considerable creation of hormonal drugs can
be explained by government grants as oppose to a private market size eﬀect.
[Insert ﬁgures 8 to 10]
A similar situation is shown on table 4. This table presents market size and ﬂow of drugs
across therapeutic categories over four diﬀerent decades.
[Insert table 4]
Similarly to ﬁgures 8-10, during the eighties and nineties market size increased as did the
creation of drugs, with the exception of the drugs named above.
This analysis has focused on market size using current income. When we use permanent
income similar results are obtained. When market size is using permanent income, it has a
smoother evolution in comparison to the current income case, but the long run trends are
similar (the correlation between the two measures of market size is 0.93).
Next section will provide more evidence and will test formally the predictions of this paper.
347 The empirical strategy and the results
7.1 The eﬀect of market size
To test the eﬀect of market size over the introduction of drugs, we follow equation (11) and
we hypothesize a linear relationship between a ﬁrm’s desired stock of drugs and market size.
We also include additional control variables, as in:
SD∗
it = αi + γt + α1MKS∗
it + α2SDit−1 + α3Govit + α4DLEGit (24)
Where i indexes drug categories and t indexes time. The variable SD∗
it denotes a ﬁrms’
desired stock of drugs while MKS∗
it,S D it−1,G o v it denote the market size of drugs, the lagged
stock of drugs and government expenditures on drugs’ research. The variable DLEGt is an
indicator function equal to one if the year is 1962 or later and it is equal to zero otherwise.
αi and γt are therapeutic ﬁxed eﬀects and time ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively.
The indicator function DLEGt was included as a way of measuring the change within the
legislation which occurred in 1962. In addition to the safety requirements of the pre-1962
period, the 1962 legislation requires the demonstration of eﬃciency of a new drug introduced
into the market. We also included the lagged stock of drugs as a measure of knowledge. We
expect a positive eﬀect of knowledge over the creation of drugs and over the desired stock of
drugs. In addition, we include government expenditure to measure government demand for
drugs. The expected signs are α1 > 0,α 2 > 0,α 3 > 0,α 4 < 0.
The ﬂow of drugs can be deﬁned as the change on the stock of drugs as in:
35FDit = SDit − SDit−1
Hence, replacing above yields:
FDit = αi + γt + α1MKS∗
it +   α2SDit−1 + α3Govit + α4DLEGit + uit (25)
Where FDit is the ﬂow of drugs of ith therapeutic category at time t,   α2 =( α2 − 1)
and uit is a random shock that measure the diﬀerence between the observed stock of drugs,
SDit, and the desired stock of drugs, SD∗
it. The variables ﬂow of drugs, stock of drugs and
government expenditures have some values equal to zero while market size has only positive
values. Thus we will take natural log in the case of market size while using the rest of the
variables in levels.
Equation (25) will be estimated by diﬀerent methods allowing us to identify the parameter
of interests. First, we use within drugs information to disentangle the parameter of interest
through the ﬁxed eﬀect method. Second, we add-up between drugs variation by using the
GLS method - this method is a weighted average of the ﬁxed eﬀect and the between estimator.
Later, we provide estimates of a Tobit regression to address a potential problem of censoring
in the ﬂow of drug data, as 298 of the 720 observations over the period 1950-1997 present
a value equal to zero. To address potential simultaneity between drugs and market size, we
construct a series of expected market size and we report new estimations for the methods
described above, using this variable as an instrument.
367.2 The Instrument
Before reporting the results, we will explain the construction of the instrument used to break
some potential simultaneity between new drugs and market size. Later, we will provide the
results using direct estimation under the three methods and also using the instrument.
The instrumental variable procedure requires an instrument correlated with market size
but uncorrelated with the ﬂow of drugs, except through the variables that are included in
the ﬂow of drugs’ equation. As instrument we will use expected market size which will be
constructed by using forecasted population, where forecasted population depends on expected
mortality rate.
Since our deﬁnition of market size depends on population by age, let’s explain the way
we forecast population at time t for a given age a, Popa
t. Let’s take population at time t-j
of age a-j, Pop
a−j
t−j , where j>0. These individuals and their mortality rate during the next
j periods, d, will determine Popa
t,a si nPop
a−j
t−j (1 − d)=Popa
t. It should be noticed that
the ﬂow of new drugs between t-j and t might aﬀect mortality rate, d. This is the potential
simultaneity problem. Rather than use the eﬀective mortality rate, d, we will use d∗, where
d∗ is the expected fraction of individuals dying in the next j periods -expected mortality rate.
The characteristic of d∗ is that it uses information available until t-j. Thus information on
new drugs invented between t-j and t is not included when constructing d∗.





t . This population, Pop
a,∗
t , should be the one observed in absence of any shock
that alters mortality rate. However, the observed mortality rate is altered by new drugs
introduced to the market. This expected population is then uncorrelated to new drugs and
it will be used on the construction of our instrument.
37To construct expected population size, we use the life-tables published in the U.S. statisti-
cal abstract. These life tables provide expected mortality rates by age which are constructed
by using current population and current death rates. The procedure to construct life tables
uses death of individuals aged 1 to 84, obtained from the National Mortality Detail Files,
while in the case of individuals aged 85 and older, mortality rates are constructed by using
medicare data on mortality rates of their aﬃliates. -see Anderson and DeTurk (2002). We
project those mortality rates into a 10-years horizon and we construct a 10-years forecast of
the population for diﬀerent age groups. Thus we deﬁne Pop∗
jt=Popj(t−10) ∗ (1 − d∗), where
d∗ is the expected mortality rate in a 10-years horizon.







This construction is analogous to the construction of market size developed above -equation
(20)- but we replace population by expected population, Pop∗
jt. Expected market size is
uncorrelated with the ﬂow of new drugs -except through variables that are included on the
ﬂow of drugs’ equation- as argued above, but also this measure must be highly correlated
with eﬀective market size, as the only deviation in the construction of expected market size
compared to eﬀective market size, is the use of d∗ instead of eﬀective mortality rate, d.
Table 6 presents the result of running market size on expected market size using FE and
GLS methods, and controlling by time eﬀects. There a signiﬁcant and positive relationship
between the variables and expected market size is clearly a much stronger instrument.
38[Insert table 6]
7.3 The Results
We will now analyze the results obtained when estimating equation (25) by diﬀerent methods.
Tables 7a and 7b present the results.
The ﬁrst three columns of tables 7a and 7b are the results of estimations using no instru-
ment. Table 7a reports results using market size deﬁned by current income while table 7b
reports results for the permanent income case. The coeﬃcient of the initial stock of drugs
is strongly signiﬁcant over the diﬀerent estimations with a range of values between 0.03 and
0.1. These values are associated with elasticities -evaluated at the means of both variables-
ranging from 0.7 to 2.45 indicating that accumulated knowledge would positively aﬀect the
creation of new drugs.
The eﬀect of government research grants is also positive and signiﬁcant. Evaluating at
the mean of variables as above, we obtain elasticities of government expenditure ranging from
0.14 to 0.54. The eﬀect of market size is positive in all the cases, as we expected, and strongly
signiﬁcant in ﬁve of the six cases. The elasticity of the ﬂow of drugs with respect to market
size is on the range 0.24 - 2.216. The FE and tobit methods provide strong and signiﬁcative
estimates of the market size eﬀect. Though using the between-drugs variations seems to
diminish this eﬀect (see GLS estimations, which include the between-drugs variation). This
eﬀect might be due to the potential simultaneity between market size and drugs. Thus we
will next address this problem by instrumenting market size.
5The mean ﬂow of drugs and the mean stock of drugs in our sample are 1.33 and 24.06 respectively
6Where we evaluate again at the mean ﬂow of drugs
39[Insert tables 7a and 7b]
Columns 4 to 6 of table 7a and 7b present the results when we use the instrument.
The range of values for the coeﬃcient of market size is much smaller than before and in
fact the point elasticity ranges between 0.77 and 2.07 (those values are concentrated around
1.5). Further, the six cases are strongly signiﬁcant. The fact that the elasticity belongs to
a more compact range of values and that the GLS case also provides a signiﬁcant result for
market size indicates that any potential bias due to simultaneity is diminished as we use the
instrument. The coeﬃcients of government expenditure and lagged stock of drugs remains
strongly signiﬁcant in all cases and in similar ranges to the above case.
7.4 The eﬀect of drugs over mortality rate
Next, we will estimate the feedback eﬀect of drugs on mortality rate and thus on market size.





t ht) - see section 2. We can assume that mortality rate for the ith
therapeutic category over time is determined by:
λit = µi + ηt + γ1SDit + γ2hit + γZit +  it (27)
Where λit is mortality rate, SDit is the number of drugs available to public purchase, hit
is total health expenditure and Zit is a set of additional control variables that might aﬀect
mortality rates. All these variables are measured per therapeutic category and time period.
Lastly, µi and ηt are therapeutic ﬁxed eﬀects and time ﬁxed eﬀects respectively while  it is a
40random shock. The expected signs are γ1 < 0,γ 2 < 0.
This speciﬁcation assumes that the mortality rate is determined by a production function
that is dependent on technology (drugs in our case), inputs (health expenditure) and some
additional variables that might shift the production function.
As additional control variables we will include year dummies, plus some demographic
information such as the prevalence rates of disease i on males, blacks, whites and married
individuals as well as the average age of individuals aﬀected by disease i. We use the fraction
of male individuals attending a hospital due to disease i as proxy variable for prevalence
rate among men. Analogous proxies variables were constructed for white, black and married
individuals. In addition, we use the average age of individuals attending a hospital due to
disease i as a proxy for the average age of individuals aﬀected by disease i. This data was
obtained from the National Hospital Discharge Survey.
Equation (27) will be estimated by FE and GLS methods. We initially report results for
the mortality rate equation using only the stock of drugs and year dummies -we omit hit,Z it.
We follow this strategy as it allows us to report results over the period 1968-1997. When we
include the measure of expenditure per therapeutic category, we can report results only over
the period 1980-1997. We use three diﬀerent left hand side variables: (1) overall mortality
rate, (2) mortality rate of individuals aged 45 to 64 and (3) mortality rate of individuals aged
65 and older. Those variables are measured as number of dead individuals per thousand of
inhabitants and they are reported in table 8a and 8b.
[Insert tables 8a and 8b]
The results in both estimation methods show a negative and signiﬁcative impact of drugs
over mortality rates, as we expected.
41This preliminary results show that the eﬀect of the stock of drugs over mortality rate
measured as death per thousands of individuals is approximately equal to -0.01. Thus an
increase of 10 per cent on the stock of new molecular entities (an increase of almost 100
NME) would produce a decrease of 1 point in mortality rate per thousand of individuals,
bringing mortality rate from 6.4 per thousand on individuals (1997 level in our sample) to
5.4. Also the eﬀect of the stock of drugs over mortality rates for individuals aged 65 years
and older (coeﬃcient approximately equal to -0.1) indicates that a 10 per cent increase on the
stock of drugs would reduce the current mortality rate of this group from 40 per thousands
-its 1997 level on our sample- to 30 per thousands individuals.
There are some other results that we will comment on next. First, the eﬀect of drugs is
larger for older individuals as it is shown when we compared the eﬀect for individuals aged 65
and older versus individuals aged 45 to 64. Second, the decreasing trend on mortality rate in
this period is completely explained by the change on the stock of drugs over time. To get this
conclusion, we test if the year dummies are equal over time on both models and we ﬁnd that
the null hypothesis (ηt = η) cannot be rejected at 38 per cent of conﬁdence for any of the left
hand side variables considered. We can conclude that there is no additional time eﬀect.
To check the rationality of the results in our mortality rate equation, we decompose the
drug data in two sub samples. The idea is the following. Our data set contains drugs that
might aﬀect diﬀerently mortality rates. In fact, the data set includes cardiovascular-renal
drugs or oncolytic drugs which are drugs attacking leading causes of death and thus we should
expect a large impact of those drugs on mortality rate. The data set also includes other drugs
that should not have such a big impact on mortality. This is the case of pain-relief, skin
related drugs, otologic drugs or ophthalmic drugs. To test this hypothesis and check how the
42model behaves in this case, we separate our sample into a ﬁrst group of drugs, including these
four types of drugs (pain-relief, skin, otologic, ophthalmic) and a second group including the
remaining drug types. Tables 8c and 8d report the result of estimating equation (27) using
these two groups.
[Insert tables 8c and 8d]
The results clearly show that the eﬀect of the drugs over mortality rates on the ﬁrst group
is signiﬁcatively smaller than the eﬀect on the second group including the remainder of the
drugs. For instance, the eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates for individuals 65 years and older
is only -0.02 on the ﬁrst group of drugs and -0.14 on the second group.
This preliminary evidence indicates that (1) a larger number of drugs is associated with
lower mortality rates and (2) this eﬀect presents variation across drugs.
We next check these results by including additional control variables into the estimations.
We report the results for the period 1980-1997 on tables 9a and 9b.
[Insert tables 9a and 9b]
In this case, we obtain similar results -when compared to tables 8a, 8b and 8c- even when
we include the proxy for health expenditure and the demographic controls per therapeutic
category. Further, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal time-eﬀects at the 54 per cent
conﬁdence for any of the cases considered. The results also show that the coeﬃcient of health
expenditure is negative, as we expected, but not signiﬁcant. Thus the results are robust to
the introduction of new variables to the equation.
It should be notice that neither GLS nor ﬁxed eﬀects address the potential simultane-
ity between mortality rates (and thus market size) and drugs. To address the simultaneity
43problem, we propose a third estimation method. We ﬁrst-diﬀerentiate equation (27) to obtain:
λit − λit−1 = ηt − ηt−1 + γ1(SDit − SDit−1)+γ2(hit − hit−1)+γ(Zit − Zit−1)+(  it −  it−1) (28)
This equation is quite useful to address simultaneity because one of its right hand side
variables is the ﬂow of drugs, e.g. FD it = SDit − SDit−1. This is the variable that might
present simultaneity. To correct the potential bias, we instrument FD it by using expected
market size. The rationality of using this variable is that (1) we know it is correlated with the
ﬂow of drugs and (2) expected market size should be correlated with changes on mortality
only through the creation of new drugs. Thus it is a variable that might be used as instrument
for the ﬂow of drugs in equation (28).
Table 9c presents the results of this third estimation method.
[Insert table 9c]
We obtain again a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the stock of drugs. The coeﬃcient of
the stock of drugs remains similar to the values obtained above. Also the coeﬃcient of the
proxy for health expenditure has similar values to the obtained above but now the coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcant.
7.5 The eﬀect of an exogenous increase of the market size
The results show the fundamental role of population on the creation of drugs. An exogenous
increase in market size produces a larger creation of drugs which aﬀects mortality rate and
thus the growth rate of population, increasing market size. This is a virtuous circle in the
44creation of drugs.
To get a feeling of these eﬀects, we will simulate an exogenous increase in drug market size
where market size is deﬁned by purchasing power of diﬀerent age groups. Purchasing power is
deﬁned as population times income, and it varies across age groups ranging from 474 billion
dollars in 1997 in the group of individuals aged 65 and older to 1134 billion dollars in 1997
in the group of individuals aged 35 to 44. Drug market size is deﬁned as weighted average of
these purchasing powers, and its value in 1997 is 583 billion dollars7.
Purchasing power of elderly individuals (65 and older) is highly inﬂuenced by transfer from
the government. Thus programs such as medicare and social security might considerable aﬀect
the purchasing power of these individuals. As a policy experiment, we will consider an increase
on social security and medicare outlays. Suppose the government increases these outlays by
approximately 36 billion dollars -which is almost a 6.5 per cent of total outlays on those items
in 19988. We will also assume that the policy is ﬁnance through redistribution of government
outlays and thus it does not require additional taxation.
This policy has a direct impact over drug market size because it increases the purchasing
power of individuals 65 and older. As these individuals represent almost a 65 per cent of
drug market size9, the implementation of the policy increases drug market size to 607 billion
dollars. Thus market size rises in 4 per cent due to the government action.
We will use the information obtained above on the eﬀects of market size over the intro-
duction of drugs and on the eﬀect of drugs over the mortality rate. The exogenous increase
in market size is initially associated with approximately 0.08 more drugs introduced to the
7This value is calculated as an average across therapeutic categories
8source: U.S. statistical abstract, 2001
9This 65 per cent is the average weight across therapeutic categories of drugs of individuals 65 and older
in 1997.
45market -using the result obtained on tables 6 and 7. However, these new drugs reduce the
mortality rates of individuals 65 and older at 0.8 per cent and thus increase market size at
0.8 per cent, producing an additional increase of drugs equal to 0.09610. Table 10 presents
the dynamic eﬀects of the initial 4 per cent increase on drug market size.
[Insert table 10]
The cycle continues until converging to a total increase of drugs equal to 0.1 and a total
increase of market size equal to 5 per cent. Thus table shows that the initial eﬀects of the
increase of market size is stretched out. In the long run, the eﬀects on market size and new
drugs are increased by 25 per cent with respect to their initial -static- eﬀects.
8 Conclusion
The paper shows that population is a fundamental element when analyzing the creation of new
drugs. We argue that pharmaceutical ﬁrms invent new drugs based on economic incentives.
A larger population, holding per capita income constant, provides a larger market size and
thus incentives to invent new drugs. These drugs then aﬀect the growth rate of population
through their direct eﬀect over the mortality rate. This feedback eﬀect produces an additional
increase in market size. These eﬀects reinforce and produce a virtuous circle on the creation
of new drugs and improvements in life expectancy.
We have provided empirical estimates that support these ideas. The estimates are quite
stable under diﬀerent estimation methods and they allow us to conclude that an exogenous
10We use the mortality rate of individuals 65 and older because individuals in this group consume more
intensively drugs
46shock to market size, and its corresponding initial eﬀect in the introduction of new drugs, are
ampliﬁed in 25 per cent.
Medicare and social security expenditures have interesting features in our framework.
These expenditures, that aﬀect the market size of drugs, may have an important dynamic
element as they may positively aﬀect the size of the future population receiving the same ben-
eﬁts, through the creation of new drugs. This is an important eﬀect that must be considered
by the policy makers.
9 Mathematical appendix
9.1 The second order condition


























This condition is satisﬁed when λhh > 0.
479.2 The utility function and the transversality condition







ns−λ(  hs)ds dt
Since u1 > 0, the integral converges to inﬁnity unless ρ − n + λ(  h) > 0. This last condition
is trivially satisﬁed when ρ>nbecause n>n−λ(  h). Thus, when ρ>nthe utility function
is bounded.
Second, we will show that the transversality condition is satisﬁed when B − δ>ρ . Let’s
deﬁne Ht =
 Mt
i=0 Hit = Nt
 Mt
i=0 hit = Ntht, Where Ht is aggregated drug consumption in








Hs is the growth rate of H at time s and H0 is the consumption of drugs at t=0.
Using the budget constraint and the equation (29), we get:





Solving this diﬀerential equation yields:





48Where C0,C 1 are constants of integration to be determined. Also it follows from (13)
that: µt = µ0e−(B−δ)t, where µ0 > 0 is the shadow price at t=0. Using those conditions, we














Hs ds−(B−δ)t] = 0 (32)





Hs ds−(B−δ)t =0 .
This second condition holds if
˙ H
H − (B − δ) < 0 ⇒
˙ K
K − (B − δ) < 0 ⇒ P H
K > 0. We may
replace the growth rate of H with the growth rate of H because in the long run K and H must
grow at the same rate 11.
Solving for P H





(ε − 1)(1 + σλ)
ε − (1 + σλ)
]+( rt − ρ)[
−(1 + σλ)
ε − (1 + σλ)
] (33)
Hence P H
K > 0 when the right hand side of (33) is positive. A suﬃcient condition is
rt = B−δ>ρ . Thus it follows that assumption 2 assures that the utility function is bounded
and the transversality condition holds.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































National Drug Code Directory versus International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9)
DRUG CLASS ICD-9 Classification
Antidotes Poisoning (960-989)
Hematologic Diseases of Blood (280-289)
Cardiovasular
Renal
Diseases of the circulatory system (390-459)
Central nervous
System
Diseases of the nervous system (320-359)
Gastrointestinal Diseases of the digestive system (520-579)
Skin/Mucose
Membrane
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue
(680-709)
Neurologic Mental disorders (290-319)
Oncolytics Neoplasm (140-239)
Opththalmics Diseases of the eye and ADNEXA (360-379)
Otologics Diseases of the ear and mastoid process (380-389)
Relief of Pain Injury (800-959)




Intestinal Infectious diseases (1-9), tuberculosis (10-18),
Other bacterial diseases (30-41), HIV infections (042),
Poliomyelitis and other…(45-49), viral diseases accompanied
by exanthem (50-57), arthropod-borne viral diseases (60-66),
other diseases due to viruses and chlamydiae (70-79),
rickettsioses and other venereal diseases (90-99), other
spirochetal diseases (100-104), mycoses (110-118),
Zoonotic bacterial diseases (20-27), helminthiases (120-129),
other infectious and parasitic diseases (130-136), , late effects








Disorders of thyroid gland (240-246)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































The National Drug Code Directory And Government Grants
For Drug Related Reasearch By Institute
DRUG CLASS Institute
Antidotes National Center for Research Resources (NCRR) and
National Institutes of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS)
Hematologic National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute (NHLBI)
Cardiovasular
Renal
National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute (NHLBI)
Central nervous
System
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)




National Institute of Arthritis, Musculosketal And Skin
Diseases (NIAMS)
Neurologic National Institute of Neurologic Disorders And Stroke
(NINDS)
Oncolytics National Cancer Institute (NCI)
Opththalmics National Eye Institute (NEI)
Otologics National Institute of Deafness And Other Communication
Disorders (NIDCD)
Relief of Pain National Center for Research Resources (NCRR) and
National Institutes of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS)








National Center for Research Resources (NCRR) and




National Center for Research Resources (NCRR) and
National Institutes of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS)
58Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min.
Flow of Drugs
Antidotes 0.15 0.36 1 0
Hematologic 0.44 0.79 3 0
Cardiovascular
Renal
2.39 2.05 7 0
Central nervous
system
2.53 2.53 12 0
Gastrointestinal 1.15 1.69 7 0
Skin / Mucosa
membrane
0.64 1.11 5 0
Neurologic 0.54 0.82 4 0
Oncolytics 1.73 1.45 5 0
Opththalmics 0.61 0.91 3 0
Otologics 0.02 0.13 1 0
Pain Relief 0.81 1.01 3 0




1.90 2.54 14 0
Metabolic 0.69 1.07 5 0
Hormones 1.75 1.80 6 0
Market size (Thousand billion
dollars)
Antidotes 0.60 0.20 0.96 0.23
Hematologic 0.36 0.11 0.53 0.13
Cardiovascular
Renal
0.30 0.12 0.49 0.08
Central nervous
system
0.39 0.09 0.52 0.16
Gastrointestinal 0.36 0.11 0.53 0.12
Skin / Mucosa
membrane
0.33 0.10 0.50 0.12
Neurologic 0.38 0.09 0.50 0.15
Oncolytics 0.33 0.11 0.51 0.10
Opththalmics 0.36 0.12 0.56 0.12
Otologics 0.44 0.13 0.66 0.17
Pain Relief 0.53 0.17 0.81 0.20




0.15 0.05 0.23 0.09
Metabolic 0.38 0.11 0.54 0.14
Hormones 0.32 0.11 0.50 0.09
Population (Thousands)
25 to 34 33372 8410 43236 22153
35 to 44 28895 6992 43998 21450
45 to 54 23584 3145 33633 17342
55 to 64 19554 2541 22220 13294
65 and older 24273 6223 34076 12270
Gov. Res. Grants (Thousands dollars)
NCRR 446883 139268 781358 291902
NIGMS 699072 147578 966967 498130
NHLBI 626720 337380 1100980 45515
NIMH 288877 192521 685150 4995
NIDDK 460050 189828 676399 21605
NIAMS 194596 21522 229904 147280
NINDS 359426 157115 599770 20011
NCI 612450 336104 1100490 73457
NEI 194529 63504 277721 91588
NIDCD 148194 17342 167557 111008





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































62Table 4: Market size and drug creation by decades
Variable 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-97
Antidotes Flow of drugs 0.2 0 0.2 0.25
Market size 0.42 0.55 0.70 0.9
Hematologics Flow of drugs 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.25
Market size 0.25 0.36 0.43 0.50
Cardiovascular Flow of drugs 2 1.7 3.7 3.25
Renal Market size 0.18 0.28 0.38 0.45
Central Nervous Flow of drugs 2.2 1.8 2.8 3.75
System Market size 0.29 0.42 0.45 0.49
Gastrointestinal Flow of drugs 0.9 0.9 1.5 0.38
Market size 0.24 0.36 0.42 0.48
Skin Flow of drugs 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.75
Market size 0.23 0.31 0.38 0.46
Neurologics Flow of drugs 0.2 0.5 0.2 1.38
Market size 0.30 0.41 0.42 0.47
Oncolytics Flow of drugs 1.7 2.5 2.3 2.8
Market size 0.22 0.33 0.41 0.47
Opththalmics Flow of drugs 0.4 1.4 0.6 0.8
Market size 0.23 0.35 0.43 0.51
Otologics Flow of drugs 0 0.1 0 0.1
Market size 0.3 0.42 0.53 0.61
Pain relief Flow of drugs 1.2 0.9 1.2 0.8
Market size 0.36 0.50 0.64 0.76
Respiratoty Flow of drugs 0.9 0.4 0.9 2.0
Market size 0.22 0.31 0.41 0.48
Immunologics Flow of drugs 1.0 1.2 3.5 5.9
Market size 0.29 0.44 0.55 0.60
Metabolic Flow of drugs 0.4 0.9 0.6 1.9
Market size 0.26 0.37 0.46 0.51
Nutrients Flow of drugs 2.3 1.9 1.4 2.0
Market size 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.46
Market size is measured in terms of 1997 billions of dollars. To construct market size we use current income
for different age categories.
63Table 5: Summary statistics of mortality rates 1968-1997
Mortality rates mean std. max min
antidotes 0.094 0.018 0.059 0.125
hematologic 0.029 0.006 0.012 0.038
cardiovascular-renal 3.32 1.19 2.23 5.21
central nervous system 0.11 0.042 0.039 0.200
gastrointestinal 0.31 0.036 0.178 0.369
skin- mucosae membrane 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.016
neurologic 0.066 0.034 0.207 0.154
oncolytic 1.78 0.203 0.838 1.933
ophthalmic 0.0001 0.00004 0.00003 0.0001
otologic 0.0005 0.0003 0.0001 0.001
pain relief 0.51 0.106 0.336 0.688
immunologic 0.29 0.209 0.097 0.619
metabolic 0.045 0.016 0.014 0.073
hormones 0.18 0.031 0.097 0.242
Mortality rates are measured as death per thousands of individuals
Table 6: Market size as function of expected market size 1950-1997
variable ln(market size) ln(market size)
ln(exp. market size) 0.81** 0.71**
(0.027) (0.026)




Standard errors in parenthesis. ”*” and ”**” indicate the variable is signiﬁcant at 0.05 and 0.01
respectively.
64Table 7a: Eﬀect of market size over ﬂow of new drugs 1950-1997
FDit = ®i + °t + ®1MKS¤







variable new drugs new drugs new drugs new drugs new drugs new drugs
method GLS FE Tobit GLS-IV FE-IV Tobit-IV
stock of drugs at t-1 0.09** 0.027* 0.044** 0.10** 0.031** 0.065**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
ln(market size) 0.32 1.91** 2.94** 1.02** 1.91** 2.21**
(0.26) (0.51) (0.57) (0.42) (0.56) (0.73)
ﬂow of gov. exp 9.27e-7** 1.76e-6** 3.04e-6** 8.74e-7** 1.68e-6** 2.69e-6**
(3.80e-7) (6.37e-7) (5.72e-7) (3.73e-7) (6.48e-7) (5.72e-7)
Legislation -0.72 -1.93** -5.42** -2.53** -1.91** -4.71**
(0.45) (0.51) (0.87) (0.64) (0.52) (1.03)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Market size instrumented no no no yes yes yes
R-sq 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.21
Observations 705 705 705 705 705
Uncensored 407 407
Censored at zero 298 298
Standard errors in parenthesis. * and ** indicate the variable is signiﬁcant at 0.05 and 0.01
respectively. The variable stock of drugs is measured at the end of last period. The variable
”ﬂow of gov. exp.” correspond to the ﬂow of government expenditure in research per therapeutic
category. Legislation is an indicator function equal to 1 after 1962 and 0 otherwise. The variables
are on levels with the exception of market size, which is measured in natural logs.











¤ is the expected mortality rate in a 10-years horizon.
65Table 7b: Eﬀect of market size over ﬂow of new drugs - Using permanent income
FDit = ®i + °t + ®1 g MKS¤









variable new drugs new drugs new drugs new drugs new drugs new drugs
method GLS FE Tobit GLS-IV FE-IV Tobit-IV
stock of drugs at t-1 0.104** 0.028* 0.052** 0.102** 0.032** 0.06**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.016) (0.007) (0.013) (0.015)
ln(market size) 0.89** 1.89** 2.64** 1.89** 1.99** 2.76**
(0.26) (0.37) (0.44) (0.36) (0.39) (0.56)
ﬂow of gov. exp 8.64e-7** 1.42e-6* 2.87e-6** 7.98e-7** 1.32e-6* 2.54e-6**
(3.60e-7) (6.39e-7) (5.53e-7) (3.49e-7) (6.44e-7) (5.67e-7)
Legislation -2.29** -2.64** -3.03** -3.20** -2.74** -4.95**
(0.50) (0.53) (0.69) (0.54) (0.54) (0.83)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Market size instrumented no no no yes yes yes
R-sq 0.33 0.18 0.35 0.25
Observations 705 705 705 705 705 705
Uncensored 407 407
Censored at zero 298 298
Standard errors in parenthesis. * and ** indicate the variable is signiﬁcant at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
The variable stock of drugs is measured at the end of last period. The variable ”ﬂow of gov. exp.”
correspond to the ﬂow of government expenditure in research per therapeutic category. Legislation is an
indicator function equal to 1 after 1962 and 0 otherwise. The variables are on levels with the exception
of market size, which is measured in natural logs.















jt are the expected mortality rate in a 10-years
horizon and permanent income.
66Table 8a: Eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates (1968-1997)
Fixed eﬀects method
variable Mortality rate Mortality rate Mortality rate
Overall 45 to 64 years old 65 years and older
Number of Drugs -0.014** -0.023** -0.13**
(0.0018) (2.2e-3) (0.014)
Year dummies yes yes yes
R-sq 0.18 0.14 0.18
Observations 450 450 450
Standard errors in parenthesis. * and ** indicate the variable is signiﬁcant at 0.05 and 0.01
respectively. Mortality rate is measured as death per thousands of individuals while the stock of
drugs is measured on levels. Both variables are measured across the 15 therapeutic categories.
Table 8b: Eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates (1968-1997)
GLS method
variable Mortality rate Mortality rate Mortality rate
Overall 45 to 64 years old 65 years and older
Number of Drugs -0.012** -0.02** -0.11**
(0.0018) (0.002) (0.014)
Year dummies yes yes yes
R-sq 0.18 0.13 0.17
Observations 450 450 450
Standard errors in parenthesis. * and ** indicate the variable is signiﬁcant at 0.05 and 0.01
respectively. Mortality rate is measured as death per thousands of individuals while the stock of
drugs is measured on levels. Both variables are measured across the 15 therapeutic categories.
67Table 8c: Eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates using two sub samples (1968-1997)
FE method-Group I
variable Mortality rate Mortality rate Mortality rate
Overall 45 to 64 years old 65 years and older
Number of Drugs -0.016** -0.025** -0.14**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.019)
Year dummies yes yes yes
R-sq 0.15 0.10 0.14
Observations 330 330 330
Table 8d: Eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates using two sub samples (1968-1997)
FE method-Group II
variable Mortality rate Mortality rate Mortality rate
Overall 45 to 64 years old 65 years and older
Number of Drugs -0.0058** -0.007** -0.02**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Year dummies yes yes yes
R-sq 0.16 0.14 0.13
Observations 120 120 120
Note to tables 8c and 8d. Standard errors in parenthesis. * and ** indicate the variable is signif-
icant at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Mortality rate is measured as death per thousands of individuals
while the stock of drugs is measured on levels. The drugs included in table 8c are: antidotes, hemato-
logic, cardiovascular-renal, central nervous system, gastrointestinal, neurologic, oncolytic, respiratory
track, immunologic, metabolic and hormones. The drugs included in table 8d are: skin-mucosae
membrane, ophthalmic and otologic drugs.
68Table 9a : Eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates - Fixed eﬀect method - Additional covariates
(1980-1997)
variable Mortality rate Mortality rate Mortality rate
Overall 45 to 64 years old 65 years and older
Number of Drugs -0.011** -0.019** -0.102**
(0.002) (0.0023) (0.016)
ln(exp. on hospital beds) -0.019 -0.020 -0.26
(0.042) (0.049) (0.33)
demographics yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
R-sq 0.35 0.24 0.34
Observations 285 285 285
Standard errors in parenthesis. * and ** indicate the variable is signiﬁcant at 0.05 and 0.01
respectively. Mortality rate is measured as death per thousands of individuals while the stock of
drugs is measured on levels. The variable ”exp. on hospital beds” is total expenditure per year on
hospital beds. Demographics includes the fraction of males, black, white and married individuals
aﬀected by the disease. Also average age of those individuals is included.
69Table 9b : Eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates - GLS method - Additional covariates (1980-1997)
variable Mortality rate Mortality rate Mortality rate
Overall 45 to 64 years old 65 years and older
Number of Drugs -0.007** -0.013** -0.057**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.013)
ln(exp. on hospital beds) -0.02 0.03 -0.09
(0.042) (0.047) (0.031)
demographics yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
R-sq 0.24 0.13 0.23
Observations 285 285 285
Standard errors in parenthesis. * and ** indicate the variable is signiﬁcant at 0.05 and 0.01
respectively. Mortality rate is measured as death per thousands of individuals while the stock of
drugs is measured on levels. The variable ”exp. on hospital beds” is total expenditure per year on
hospital beds. Demographics includes the fraction of males, black, white and married individuals
aﬀected by the disease. Also average age of those individuals is included.
70Table 9c : Eﬀect of drugs over mortality rates - Additional covariates (1980-1997)
First diﬀerence of the data - Using instrument for drugs
variable Mortality rate Mortality rate Mortality rate
Overall 45 to 64 years old 65 years and older
Number of Drugs -0.014** -0.009 -0.094**
(0.005) (0.011) (0.030)
ln(exp. on hospital beds) -0.016** -0.009 -0.12**
(0.007) (0.015) (0.040)
demographics yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
R-sq 0.18 0.05 0.20
Observations 240 240 240
Standard errors in parenthesis. * and ** indicate the variable is signiﬁcant at 0.05 and 0.01
respectively. The variables are in ﬁrst diﬀerences and we instrument the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the drug
stock (ﬂow of drugs) by using expected market size. Mortality rate is measured as death per thousands
of individuals while the stock of drugs is measured on levels. The variable ”exp. on hospital beds” is
total expenditure per year on hospital beds. Demographics includes the fraction of males, black, white
and married individuals aﬀected by the disease. Also average age of those individuals is included.
71Table 10: The dynamics on the creation of drugs
Initial shock of 4 per cent increase on market size
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